temporary eclipse in the mid-nineteenth century. The main focus, however, is on their later renewal, at a time when germ theory and Pasteurian immunology were transforming attitudes towards the treatment of infectious diseases, whether of humans or livestock. The central theme here is the choice of strategies employed by the various national veterinary services in the eradication of contagious bovine pleuro-pneumonia (CBPP).
The veterinary bureaucracies of the time in Europe, some of which were very recent formations, were conscious of their new capacities, and anxious to demonstrate their professional value. In the case of CBPP they seemingly had a choice of weapons: they could either try to stamp out the disease or employ the pre-Pasteunan form of vaccination known as "tail inoculation" (for its nature, see below, pp. 319-20) . The choices made differed quite radically across the major states and the reasons for this are investigated here.
The Origins of Stamping-Out The initial stimulus to develop livestock disease control programmes was provided by a series of major incursions of rinderpest into Western Europe from its homeland in the Eurasian steppes from at least the seventeenth century onwards. Rinderpest, or "cattle plague", as its name attests, was regarded as the livestock equivalent of bubonic plague. It was marked by levels of mortality among cattle even higher than for its human synonym, and it seems probable that the use of such countermeasures as isolation and quarantine against rinderpest owed something to public policies against plague.3 The crucial further step, the slaughter of diseased stock and the slaughter or isolation of those in contact with them, appears to have evolved quite independently in Italy, Britain and the Austrian Netherlands. 4 Slaughter and/or quarantine as policies necessarily involved other elements if they were to succeed. Above all else, they required a high degree of compliance from stockowners. This could be achieved only by a mixture of punitive regulation and compensation for slaughtered animals, preferably the full live-weight value of stock to owners who faced the loss of their livelihood. Further, an effective slaughter programme was logically complemented by controls over livestock movement, amounting at times to the complete prohibition of internal trade, together with quarantine or prohibition of entry at state borders. A further extension of such strategies was to try and gain information of likely future threats. The sum of these measures explains why action could be undertaken only by the state. Compensation was expensive, while slaughter and trade restriction were unlikely to be popular. Only the state had the resources to support such programmes and the power to deal effectively with offenders.
John Fisher The slaughter programmes against rinderpest in the eighteenth century were attended by a high degree of success in most cases, a tribute to the growing power and competence of the European states in undertaking what Eric Jones has called "disaster management".5 Their nature can also be related to the intellectual ethos ofthe Enlightenment, to a new willingness to search out and experiment with novel remedies for traditional problems. Variations in this ethos also help to explain something of the later development of the programmes.
By the eighteenth century, significant differences had already emerged between, on the one hand, Britain and the Netherlands, and, on the other, the monarchies of the ancien regime. The former states were more commercial in orientation, less centralized and bureaucratic and less prone to interfere in the economy and society. Thus, in Britain, where slaughter programmes had encountered considerable resistance, governments were relatively loath to interfere with private commerce. Their slaughter programmes were dismantled once successful, to be forgotten for a century.6
The British Isles also had the advantage of relative isolation from the source of the rinderpest epizootics in the Russian steppes. Conversely, Prussia lay across their path and its rulers developed and maintained the type of strict measures consistent with an authoritarian tradition. Slaughter programmes were complemented by trade interdicts and the use of the army to mount a border cordon in response to information of the approach of rinderpest. Such measures continued into the late nineteenth century, despite the cordon being both outflanked and penetrated in the 1850s and 1860s.7
A dirigiste tradition also marked the evolution of livestock disease control in France, where the first use was made of some sort of veterinary expertise. The 'pizooties, 1991, 10: 985-94, pp. political economy and the origins of the veterinary 989-90; J B Simonds, 'Report on Steppe Murrain or profession in Britain', Argos, 1995, 12: 45-5 1. Eradication of Contagious Bovine Pleuro-Pneumonia centralized system develop to meet the problem of epizootics before the mid-nineteenth century. In France, local veterinarians eked out a precarious existence with little money or authority.10 In Prussia, district veterinarians were also poorly paid and not even responsible for the implementation of regulations against rinderpest until well into the nineteenth century.1' A variety of reasons can be advanced for this hiatus. The French Wars were one early factor. Wars made for the dissemination of livestock diseases while inhibiting countermeasures. Thereafter, in the first half of the nineteenth century, there was something of an intellectual reaction against theories of disease causation based on contagion or infection,12 although, with some exceptions,13 this was more muted in veterinary circles than medical.
Certainly, measures based on the premise that rinderpest was contagious remained in force on the borders of the most vulnerable states. As noted above, Prussia maintained a military cordon, while the Austrian Empire kept its strict border controls against rinderpest when those against bubonic plague were allowed to fall into disuse. 14 The Prussian and Austrian cordons may have provided a degree ofprotection to countries to their west. Certainly, during the forty years after the end of the French Wars the threat of rinderpest receded to the point of being almost forgotten in Britain and the Netherlands. In its absence, the main threat of stock losses came from two other infectious livestock diseases, CBPP and foot-and-mouth disease (FMD). And neither veterinary expertise nor slaughter policies could control or contain these diseases where enzootically established.
Given the extreme infectivity of FMD, its associated low mortality, and a high level of doubt over whether it was actually infectious, it is not surprising that little effort was made to control its incidence. Veterinarians offered cures but these did little beyond bringing the incipient profession into disrepute.15 CBPP was the more serious threat; it was attended by death rates second only to rinderpest. However, although most veterinarians considered CBPP contagious, they had no remedy to offer stockowners. One factor was that they knew little about this or any other disease of cattle. Veterinary research and training in the new colleges had their focus overwhelmingly on the horse in the first half of the nineteenth century. 16 The distinct pathology ofCBPP had been described in the eighteenth century, but features of its aetiology remained controversial much later. Even more importantly, as will be seen below, although it was stamped out in some regions, certain characteristics of the disease made it more difficult to deal with than rinderpest. The variable outcomes and verdicts reflected the contemporary limitations of scientific method as much as those of Willems' technique. It was generally agreed that some immunity was conferred by tail inoculation but how much (or for how long) was seriously at issue. The degree of success depended on how the test was conducted and how the operation was performed, as well as on the source, the virulence and the age of the "pleural" or "pulmonary exudate" (fluid either from the pleural cavity or encystments in the lungs of a diseased animal) used. There were so many variables that could easily go wrong that the caution of official veterinarians was understandable.
Inoculation also led to many animals losing their tails and to the inadvertent transfer of other diseases. Nevertheless, and although it was not an ideal magic bullet, it became widely adopted, especially in the Netherlands. of animal diseases in Great Britain in the nineteenth veterinarians, medicine and germs in Britain, 1860-century ', Vet. Rec., 1975 -76, N.S., 6: 3-12. 1900 ', Vet. Hist., 1992 Eradication of Contagious Bovine Pleuro-Pneumonia not curing" on the grounds of cost-effectiveness, then their approach was firmly in the European mainstream. In fact, there were a number of ironies to the policy choices made and the objectives attained in different countries. The eradication of CBPP was first achieved in the Netherlands, then in Britain, the original sources of global dissemination. The chief weapon employed in both countries was stamping out, backed by rigorous quarantine, in a dramatic reversal of their previous reluctance to interfere with freedom of commerce. Conversely, in the more dirigiste states of France and Prussia, where CBPP remained enzootic at the end of the century, traditional approaches based on stamping out and quarantine were modified substantially in attempting to contain the disease. As will be seen below, the contrasts provide a nice example of the primacy of economic considerations over cultural tradition.
This was because circumstances differed radically between countries. Thus, Britain, as an island, was in the enviable position of being able to prevent CBPP incursions at a much lower cost than any other country. Second, policy was never the result of coherent, thoughtout planning put into practice. Rather, it evolved over time in response to forces such as the relative political power of various interested groups, which could be at odds with each other. Policy formulation was also marked by considerable interdependence, in part reflecting the nature of the European cattle trade and the manner in which policy in one country had implications for another. Finally, policy makers learnt from experience, either their own or that of others. These themes are explored below.
Britain
Several hundred thousand live cattle were imported annually into Britain in the course of the 1860s. In 1865, this resulted in the introduction of rinderpest and the subsequent epizootic, the "cattle plague", transformed attitudes towards infectious livestock diseases. In particular, it led farmers to establish the Central and Associated Chambers of Agriculture in 1866, in large part to lobby for government measures against disease.52 The Chambers movement increasingly sought the prohibition oflivestock imports; the threat ofdisease was the prime overt concern, but breeders, especially, could see the advantages of such restrictions. Over John Fisher He also exaggerated the infectiousness of CBPP, arguing that controls on imports were pointless as the disease was so firmly entrenched in Britain that only the most stringent internal measures could reduce its incidence.54 As the first state Veterinary Adviser, as editor of the Veterinarian for three decades to 1881, and as Principal of the Royal Veterinary College in the 1870s,55 Simonds had considerable influence. His views were also much to the taste of Liberal free traders who viewed state interference with imports with great suspicion.
Simonds' protege and successor in the Department, G T Brown, echoed his views in the 1870s. Nevertheless, his term in office saw the prohibition on live imports policed with increasing effectiveness. A shrewd political bureaucrat, Brown moved towards an alliance with the Chambers over time, especially as the political opposition to import controls subsided with the growth of the chilled and frozen meat trade.56 Rather than portraying the prohibition of live imports as an alternative to stringent domestic measures, Brown offered them as complements in a programme that could eradicate CBPP.
The 1878 Act had provided for the slaughter of cattle diseased with CBPP, but left implementation in the hands of local authorities. They also bore the cost, and were the more reluctant to enforce slaughter where the incidence of CBPP was high and the cost thus greatest.57 Brown sought central government funding and greater departmental powers in the implementation of controls. With the growth of the railway system allowing increased supplies of country milk into the towns, an attraction for the Chambers, representing rural stockowners, was that the chief burden of internal measures would fall on their competitors, the urban dairies that were notorious centres of infection.
The alliance stood Brown in good stead when he faced a further challenge to his programme in the 1880s. Inoculation first surfaced as a serious issue in Britain or, more specifically, in Scotland, during that decade, largely due to the efforts of a peripatetic veterinary surgeon, Richard Rutherford. After Veterinarian, Feb. 1887 , 60: bovides (1850 -1900 , Hayez, Imprimeur de 201-10, and Report of the Departmental Committee l'Academie Royal de Belgique, Bruxelles, 1900, p.45. pressure to win a Departmental Committee on the question, at which Rutherford was given an extensive hearing. This was not to his advantage. Although, as Worboys notes, inoculation could have been presented as a "scientific" alternative to slaughter,6' Rutherford was not interested in this and was happily ignorant of any immunological principles involved. His emphasis was solely on the relative cost-effectiveness of inoculation as a potential basis for eradicating CBPP. Brown, who had inherited his mentor's antipathy to inoculation,62 turned this to his own advantage. Other witnesses dwelled on the shortcomings of inoculation, notably that it did not "take" on animals that already had the disease, masking the survival of CBPP and thus exacerbating the critical problem of symptomless carriers. As was also emphasized, the efficacy of inoculation remained variable and there was still uncertainty as to the length of protection given. Under intensive questioning, Rutherford was reduced to unsupported assertions of the complete efficacy and reliability of his method and of his own ability to recognize animals already incubating CBPP.63 The Committee's report could hardly do otherwise than come down wholeheartedly in favour of stamping-out.64
Brown thus won the debate, eventually gaining the financial support and powers necessary for a rigorous slaughter programme in 1890. The 
The Netherlands
The British Veterinary Department's close interest in the Dutch campaign of eradication included a special survey in its annual report in 1885,66 when it was evident the Dutch were close to success. Here, and in evidence to the 1888 Committee, the emphasis was on the critical importance of slaughter. That tail inoculation was also employed was mentioned, only to be dismissed, using selective statistics (the Department's It was an irony of the Dutch success, considerable as this was, that a further contributory factor lay in the progressive removal of one of the incentives to undertake an eradication programme. The live cattle export trade to Britain declined rapidly in the late 1 870s, due less to British restrictions than to rising demand and thus meat prices in Germany and France, according to Richard Perren.7' This reduced greatly the potential for infection from cattle in transit across the Netherlands, and permitted the adoption oftrade bans similar to the British. The last two or three cases of CBPP were in stock introduced from Belgium, with very few cattle exported or re-exported to Britain by the mid-i 880s. The point also serves to emphasize the great advantage the British had in seeking to stamp out CBPP.
As the only major importer of livestock, Britain was in a position unilaterally to insist on the terms under which they were given entry. As an island, it was able to police such entry in a more cost-effective fashion than any other European country. The Swiss experience also serves to demonstrate the point. As early as the 1850s, the Swiss had put in place a stamping out programme that was effective and relatively cheap. Compensation was low but cattle owners were allowed to sell the hides and even the meat of slaughtered stock, these not being considered infectious or a danger to human health.72 However, each time that Switzerland was close to claiming completely CBPP free status, introduced stock caused further epizootics that then had to be dealt with. Chicago, Alexander Eger, 1914, pp. 390, 404-5. Eradication of Contagious Bovine Pleuro-Pneumonia variations on the combination of inoculation and slaughter that had become the accepted model. This left only one major western European country still facing serious problems in achieving eradication.
Germany
France had two advantages in controlling CBPP by the time a serious programme was established. First, as elsewhere, the decline ofurban dairies under competition from country milk reduced a notorious centre of infection. Secondly, its frontiers were with states where CBPP was either not present or fast being brought under control. Spain had always been free (although the disease was introduced at the end of the century). Belgium, Switzerland and Italy were free or nearly so by the mid-l 890s. As for Germany, although CBPP remained a problem well into the next century, the western regions saw only minor sporadic incursions even in the late 1880s. It was in the eastern regions of Germany that CBPP remained enzootic, and this was in part a result of the continuing problem of incursions from further east.
The Prussian authorities had long been accustomed to having to meet periodic invasions of rinderpest from the East, and this also became true of CBPP. Before the formation of the German empire, policies towards CBPP varied among the states, and this remained the case after 1871, although rinderpest became an imperial responsibility.85 It remained a problem as late as the 1880s, the prime concern above all others. From the early 1870s, the old military cordon was gradually modified and greater emphasis placed on veterinary expertise and trade interdicts (with a view to reducing the price premium that made cattle smuggling so attractive). However, the states retained separate veterinary departments and policy towards CBPP continued to vary widely.
CBPP had been enzootic in Schleswig and Holstein when these provinces were under Danish rule (and despite Denmark's disease-free status). As part of the German empire, the importance of dairying and cattle exports led them, despite the cost, to institute a herd slaughter programme. This was successful and stringent border controls thereafter kept these provinces largely free ofCBPP.86 Elsewhere, however, such measures could hardly be contemplated in the face ofthe potential costs. In Prussia, after 1875, diseased animals were supposed to be slaughtered, but compensation (met by a tax on farmers) and thus compliance were often poor. The emphasis, internally and on the borders, was on a three-month quarantine for introduced or contact stock and, quite apart from compliance problems, this could be inadequate in the face of symptomless carriers.87 Karl Muller, professor at the Berlin Veterinary College, praised the British slaughter programme in 1888, and lamented that "we should have gone the same way in Prussia if we could pay the enormous costs such a stamping-out system would require".88
Even so, CBPP declined in incidence in Prussia over the next decade, in part due to a decline in urban dairies and more effective border controls with the Russian and Austrian empires. The Empire92 and, given the continuing price differentials between east and west, Germany was always vulnerable to repeated re-introductions. Further, sugar beet production, unlike urban dairying, was a growth industry, a major contributor to the German economy. In these circumstances, inoculation was a cost-effective alternative to a full eradication programme based on slaughter.
Conclusion
In 1898, Edmond Nocard and Pierre Roux identified the causal organism of CBPP.93 In the same year, in his veterinary textbook, Nocard also stated that "the question of treating pleuropneumonia is of limited value, since the animal disease laws of every country stipulate the slaughter of sick cattle". 94 It was a statement with which veterinarians in state services could all agree; the British Veterinary Department was far from alone in its predilection for slaughter.
The eradication of CBPP in most countries of Western Europe in the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries was a considerable achievement. While slaughter had worked admirably against rinderpest, and was the preferred centrepiece of strategies against infec-with stockowners was due to its cost-effectiveness. It minimized both the direct costs of a control programme and the indirect costs from disruption to trade and commercial operations generally.
Stockowners proved a powerful force in modifying the preference of state veterinarians for a slaughter programme. In Britain, they achieved their prime objective of import controls before a slaughter programme was seriously mounted. By the time this happened, the costs of slaughter for the main group of stockowners, in rural areas, were relatively low and they were generally willing to give their support. Outside Britain, stockowners proved effective in lobbying their political representatives in favour of tail inoculation, and this was attractive to the latter for the same reasons-its relative cheapness in comparison to slaughter. The resulting policy mix proved efficient as well as cost-effective, especially and earliest in the Netherlands, not least because it made for better compliance. In fact, if there is a lesson from the Western European achievement it would be that, while slaughtering sick and contact animals makes sense against infectious diseases, such a strategy should be adapted to circumstances and implemented with an eye to the size of the costs involved and on who bears these costs.
